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The Death Penalty and the Society We Want∗ 
STEPHEN B. BRIGHT∗∗ 
Winston Churchill once observed: “The mood and temper of the public 
in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfail-
ing tests of any country. . . . [They] mark and measure the stored-up 
strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue within 
it.”  It is worth a moment to examine how our society measures up by this 
standard and to look at the role that lawyers play in shaping the kind of 
society we have. 
At the local level, we can tell a lot about a community by how it treats 
a homeless person suffering from schizophrenia who is begging on the 
street.  One possibility is to look upon that person with the thought that 
there but for grace go I, that this person is desperately in need of help, and 
that we—individually and as a community—must respond by giving a 
helping hand and making sure that the person receives food, shelter, cloth-
ing, and care for such a debilitating mental illness.  Another possibility is 
to simply ignore the person, to step around him or her on the way to buying 
a five-dollar cup of coffee, asking one’s self only: “Why should I help this 
person?  Why should I give any money?  Why should I do anything at all?”  
Another approach—the predominant view in many communities today—is 
to ask, why isn’t that person in jail?  Why hasn’t the person been arrested 
for violating one of the “quality of life crimes” which many communities 
have adopted to protect the quality of life of those better off at the expense 
of those who are worse off?  They have accomplished this by criminalizing 
behavior such as jaywalking, loitering, panhandling, and other conduct that 
makes it possible for the police to arrest almost anyone to clear the street of 
people we do not want to see.  This is the “broken windows” approach to 
policing that Rudolph Guiliani used in New York.  It uses the criminal law 
to clear the streets of the homeless, the mentally ill, and other “undesir-
ables.”  So there are three possible approaches: compassion, indifference, 
and hostility.  The one adopted by a community tells us a lot about it. 
Of course, there are different approaches to crime and criminals that 
are adopted at a much higher level of government.  We might ask, does a 
society torture those it believes guilty of crimes?  There is a fairly clear 
  
 ∗ The Frank Rowe Kenison Lecture, Franklin Pierce Law Center, April 9, 2007. 
 ∗∗ President and Senior Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia; J. Skelly 
Wright Fellow, Yale Law School; B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of Kentucky. 
File: Bright - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 9:21:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 9:21:00 PM 
370 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
line between societies that torture people and those that do not torture.  The 
Bush Administration tried to fudge it by adopting a definition for torture 
that did not include what the rest of the world understands to be torture.1  
But it did not work.  Other nations and people throughout the world look 
upon the United States differently today because of its resort to torture than 
they did before.  Unfortunately, when many people around the world think 
of the United States, they now think of holding people for years without 
trials at Guantanamo instead of the values symbolized by the Statue of 
Liberty. 
We may also ask, does a society kill?  Does it have capital punish-
ment?  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said that the death penalty was society’s 
final statement that it would not forgive.  Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Goldberg said that the deliberate institutionalized taking of life by the state 
was the greatest possible degradation of a human being.  A society that 
responds to crime with capital punishment is an unforgiving society.  Its 
use of such a degrading punishment says something about its commit-
ment—or lack of commitment—to human dignity.  It also reflects either 
arrogance on the part of the society—based on a belief that its institutions 
are infallible—or indifference—a belief that the people affected by its de-
cisions to kill are of so little worth that it does not matter if they are mis-
takenly executed. 
The point with both the death penalty and torture is not whether there 
are people who may deserve to be tortured or put to death, but whether the 
society is willing to engage in such practices.  They are not only degrading 
to the person who is tortured or executed, they are also degrading to the 
society that tortures or executes.  These practices coarsen the society and 
the people in it.  Four countries—Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United 
States—account for ninety-one percent of the executions in the world to-
day.2  The company one keeps also says a lot about a society.   
If a society retains the primitive punishment of putting people to death, 
despite the availability of more recently developed methods of punishment, 
such as imprisonment in secure facilities, it should be committed to having 
a legal system that is capable to the extent humanly possible of ensuring 
the accuracy and the reliability of decisions that result in imposition of the 
death penalty.  At a minimum, it should do everything it can to prevent 
conviction of the innocent, the influence of racial bias, and the arbitrary 
and uneven imposition of the death penalty.   
  
 1. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR 
ON TERROR 34–37 (2007). 
 2. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/c3d650aa-a2a8-11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/act500022 
007en.pdf. 
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We have today indisputable evidence of the fallibility of our legal sys-
tem.  DNA comparisons have established beyond doubt that many people 
convicted of crimes—including some sentenced to death—were com-
pletely innocent.3  Unfortunately, we do not know how many people were 
wrongfully convicted in cases where there was no biological evidence 
available for comparison or, if there was such evidence, it was not pre-
served.   
The DNA exonerations are a powerful reminder that police, prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries make mistakes with regard to the most basic issue 
the legal system is responsible for deciding—guilt and innocence.  Many 
public officials responsible for the criminal justice system—and many 
members of our society—would prefer not to think about that, but now it is 
undeniable.  We have seen people who have lost years of their lives be-
cause of wrongful convictions and perpetrators of crimes who have re-
mained at large because someone else was convicted of the crimes they 
committed.   
It is impossible to eliminate the risk of error, but it can be minimized 
by such things as improving techniques for eyewitness identification, pre-
venting interrogation practices that may produce false confessions, improv-
ing practices and oversight in crime laboratories, and assuring that those 
accused of crimes are capably represented.4  A commission appointed by 
Governor George Ryan in Illinois following the exonerations of thirteen 
people sentenced to death in that state made comprehensive recommenda-
tions for reducing error in capital cases,5 and the American Bar Association 
has established standards for the performance of counsel in capital cases.6  
But many jurisdictions have not implemented these measures because of 
cost, resistance to change, or indifference. 
The most fundamental element of fairness in an adversary system of 
justice is representation of the accused by competent counsel.  Our legal 
system is so complex and contains so many procedural traps that a lay per-
  
 3. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 262–67 (2000). 
 4. See generally id.; The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Priority Issues, http://www.innocence 
project.org/fix/Priority-Issues.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). 
 5. See COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_ 
report/summary_recommendations.pdf. 
 6. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 989 (rev. ed. 2003), available at 
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/confer_aba_DPGuidelines.pdf.  The guidelines are not binding on lawyers 
defending capital cases, but they have been cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in finding 
that representation violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 
374, 387, 387 n.7 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .”). 
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son accused of a crime can no more navigate it alone than a passenger can 
fly a plane in the absence of the pilot.  Those accused of crimes rely upon 
lawyers to protect all of their legal rights, investigate thoroughly the facts, 
test the prosecution’s case against them through cross-examination of wit-
nesses and other means, produce evidence that casts doubt upon guilt, and, 
for those found guilty, present evidence to be considered in mitigation with 
regard to punishment. 
Such representation must be provided to both rich and poor for, as Jus-
tice Hugo Black stated for the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois,7 
“[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has.”8  However, as we all know, in our coun-
try today, the kind of justice people get depends very much upon how 
much money they have.  The kind of equal justice described by Justice 
Black has been an aspiration of our legal system—Justice William Brennan 
described the Bill of Rights as a “lodestar for our aspirations”9—but it is 
questionable how vigorously it is being pursued today despite such draco-
nian punishments as death, life imprisonment without parole, and long 
prison terms.  
Although a person accused of a crime must be provided a lawyer at 
trial,10 many states still lack comprehensive and adequate indigent defense 
systems.11  Even in capital cases, the representation provided in many ju-
risdictions is simply a disgrace to the legal profession and the criminal 
justice system.  There have been capital cases in which the lawyers ap-
pointed to represent the defendant have failed to investigate the facts of the 
crime or the backgrounds of their clients but have still been found to be 
sufficient counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.12  Death sen-
tences have even been imposed and upheld in cases in which the defense 
lawyers were asleep, intoxicated, or under the influence of drugs.13   
  
 7. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 8. Id. at 19. 
 9. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., To the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown Univer-
sity, October 12, 1985, in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1986). 
 10. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25, 37–38 (1972). 
 11. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant’s Right to Competent Counsel: It’s 
Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 140–141 (2005); see also Stephen Henderson, 
Defense Often Inadequate in Four Death-Penalty States, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Jan. 16, 2007 
(part one in a series of five articles regarding the poor quality of legal representation found in a study of 
eighty death penalty cases from Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia). 
 13. See Jeffrey L. Kirshmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–60 (1996) 
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A defendant relies upon counsel to protect all other rights, but a defen-
dant is powerless to obtain a competent lawyer in the first place.  Poor 
people accused of crimes are assigned lawyers.  They are often dependent 
on the luck of the draw with regard to the competency of the lawyers they 
get.  This is illustrated by the plight of an African American man, Gregory 
Wilson, who faced the death penalty in Covington, Kentucky.  The judge 
presiding over the case had difficulty finding a lawyer for Wilson because 
a Kentucky statute limited compensation for defense counsel in capital 
cases to $2500.  When the head of the local indigent defense program sug-
gested to the judge that more compensation was necessary to obtain a law-
yer qualified for such a serious case, the judge suggested that the indigent 
defense program rent a river boat and sponsor a cruise down the Ohio 
River to raise money for the defense. 
The judge eventually obtained counsel by posting a notice in the court-
house asking any member of the bar to take the case with the plea, 
“PLEASE HELP.  DESPERATE.”  The notice said nothing about qualifi-
cations to handle a capital case.  The judge appointed two lawyers who 
responded.  
This method of selecting counsel did not produce a “dream team.”  The 
lead counsel can charitably be described as well past his prime.  The law-
yer did not have an office, but practiced out of his home, where a Bud-
weiser beer sign was prominently displayed.  The police had recently pried 
up the boards in his living room floor and recovered stolen property.  The 
telephone number he gave Wilson was for a bar called “Kelly’s Keg.”  The 
other lawyer, who had volunteered to assist lead counsel, had no felony 
trial experience. 
Wilson, realizing that the lawyers were not up to the task of defending 
a capital murder case, repeatedly objected to being represented by the law-
yers.14  He repeatedly asked the judge that he be provided with a lawyer 
who was capable of defending a capital case.15  The judge refused and pro-
ceeded to conduct a trial that was a travesty of justice.  Lead counsel was 
not even present for some of the trial.  He cross-examined only a few wit-
nesses, including one witness whose direct testimony he missed because he 
was out of the courtroom.  Wilson was sentenced to death. 
  
(citing cases in which convictions were upheld even though defense lawyers were intoxicated, abusing 
drugs, or mentally ill). 
 14. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Ky. 1992) (noting that “[a]t many points 
during the trial, Wilson repeated his assertion that his court-appointed standby counsel were, to use 
Wilson’s words, ‘unprepared, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and lacked the necessary competence and ex-
perience’”); see also Wilson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 901, 902–04 (Ky. 1998). 
 15. See Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 883 (quoting transcript in which Wilson asks for “competent coun-
sel”); id. at 884 (noting Wilson’s “insistence that the court appoint him an attorney who met Wilson’s 
specifications as a death penalty expert”). 
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What more could Gregory Wilson do to enforce his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel?  He objected.  He complained about the lawyers ap-
pointed by the judge, who were clearly incapable of defending him.  He 
asked for a real lawyer.  But these efforts were insufficient to enforce the 
right to counsel.   
Most of those accused of crimes who receive inadequate representation 
do not realize the incompetence of the lawyer appointed to defend them.  
But even if they do, they face a Hobson’s choice.  If they complain, they 
run the risk that the quality of the representation will deteriorate even fur-
ther because they will offend their lawyer, but the judge will not replace 
them.  Or there is the equally valid fear that the next lawyer appointed by 
the same judge may be even worse.  Unless a state has a public defender 
system with a great deal of integrity, defendants may end up like Gregory 
Wilson. 
In theory, the right to counsel can be vindicated after trial if the defen-
dant can establish that the representation at trial amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.16  The Catch-22 for most poor people, however, is 
that they need another lawyer—and a capable one—to establish in post-
conviction proceedings the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, but the Su-
preme Court has held that they have no right to a lawyer at that stage of the 
process.17  Even if the state provides a lawyer to raise a claim of ineffec-
tiveness as some do, there is no guarantee that the new lawyer will be any 
more competent than trial counsel.  In Texas, for example, a person facing 
the death penalty may have equally bad lawyers at trial and in post-
conviction proceedings. 
The capital of capital punishment is Houston, Harris County, Texas.  
More people sentenced to death in Harris County have been executed than 
from any state except Texas itself.18  The Houston Chronicle described the 
trial of George McFarland in Houston as follows: 
  
 16. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a two part test for deter-
mining whether an accused received ineffective assistance: (1) whether the performance of counsel was 
deficient and, if so, (2) whether there is a substantial probability that the representation affected the 
outcome).  Thus, even when a defendant receives deficient representation, the conviction and sentence 
may be upheld based upon a reviewing court’s conclusion that it did not matter all that much.  See also 
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the 
Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995). 
 17. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 
(1987). 
 18. See TEXAS COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, TEXAS DEATH PENALTY 
DEVELOPMENTS IN 2007: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2007), available at http://www.tcadp.org/uploads/ 
File/2007annualreport.pdf (reporting that at the end of 2007, 102 people sentenced to death in Harris 
County had been executed, more than any state except Texas as a whole).  Only five states executed 
over fifty people between the resumption of capital punishment in 1976 and the end of 2007: Texas 
(408), Virginia (98), Oklahoma (86), Missouri (66), and Florida (64).  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
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Seated beside his client . . . defense attorney John Benn spent 
much of Thursday afternoon’s trial in . . . deep sleep.  His mouth 
kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoulders, and 
then he awakened just long enough to catch himself and sit up-
right.  Then it happened again.  And again.  And again.   
Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness 
was on the stand describing another aspect of the Nov. 19, 1991, 
arrest of George McFarland in the robbery-killing of grocer Ken-
neth Kwan. 
. . . . 
Court observers said Benn seems to have slept his way through 
virtually the entire trial.19 
When the judge finally called a recess, the lawyer was asked how he could 
be sleeping while supposedly defending a capital murder case.  He replied, 
“It’s boring.”20  The more important question was asked of the judge: how 
could he preside over a capital case in which the lawyer was sleeping?  He 
answered that the Constitution guarantees a right to a lawyer, but it does 
not guarantee that the lawyer must be awake.21  This judge was a true strict 
constructionalist. 
Three people in Houston—George McFarland, Calvin Burdine, and 
Carl Johnson—were represented by lawyers who slept during their capital 
trials while supposedly defending them.  The entire United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, struggled with the question of 
whether Burdine’s right to counsel was violated because his lawyer, Joe 
Frank Cannon, whose file was less than three pages of notes, slept during 
parts of the two-day trial in which Burdine was convicted and condemned 
to death. 
It is an embarrassment to the legal profession that lawyers were argu-
ing to an en banc court about whether the Constitution was violated by a 
defense attorney sleeping while supposedly defending a person in a capital 
trial.  But the judges wanted to know whether Cannon slept through any 
important parts of the very short trial.  There was no way to know since 
Cannon did not make a record as to when he was asleep and when he was 
awake.  One judge asked if there was a difference between a lawyer who 
  
CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2008), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/FactSheet.pdf. 
 19. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 
14, 1992, at A35. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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slept and one who was under the influence of alcohol or drugs or suffering 
from a mental illness.  It was an important question because, as a panel of 
the court had noted in upholding Burdine’s conviction and death sentence, 
courts have found that lawyers were not ineffective even though they had 
been impaired by alcohol, drug use, or mental illness.22  To distinguish that 
precedent, it was pointed out that a lawyer who was under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or mental illness would at least be conscious, although im-
paired.  If a lawyer is sleeping, on the other hand, he or she is unconscious.  
A lawyer who has slept during parts of the trial cannot argue to the jury in 
closing that it did not hear any witness say a certain thing, as lawyers often 
do, because the lawyer may not know whether any witnesses testified that 
way or not.   
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately decided, by a vote of nine 
to five, that Burdine’s right to counsel was violated and he was entitled to a 
new trial,23 but not without a very bitter dissent by Judge Barksdale.24   
Most people caught sleeping on the job in any line of work are fired, 
but Houston judges continued to appoint Cannon to capital and other 
criminal cases.  Cannon also slept during the capital trial of Carl Johnson.  
A law professor who later represented Johnson found in reading the trial 
transcript that Cannon’s “ineptitude . . . jumps off the printed page.”25  
Nevertheless, the death sentence was upheld by the Texas and federal 
courts.  Johnson was executed by Texas in 1996.26 
These cases give a new meaning to being represented by the “dream 
team.”  Of course, most lawyers do not sleep during trial.  But all too often, 
lawyers appointed to defend poor people facing the death penalty fail to 
investigate, do not know the law, or are at best mediocre in their represen-
tation.27  But Johnson’s execution and the bitter division of a federal court 
of appeals over whether sleeping during a capital trial violates the Consti-
tution demonstrates how little regard the courts have for the quality of rep-
resentation provided to poor people facing the death penalty.  One federal 
judge, in reluctantly upholding a death sentence, observed that, as inter-
preted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution “does not require that 
  
 22. See Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and rev’d en banc, 262 F.3d 
336 (5th Cir. 2001).  The panel decided, by a two-to-one vote, to uphold Burdine’s conviction and 
sentence. 
 23. Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338. 
 24. See id. at 357 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). 
 25. David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694–95 
(1996). 
 26. Id. at 710. 
 27. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
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the accused, even in capital cases, be represented by able or effective coun-
sel.”28 
And those sentenced to death have no constitutional right to a lawyer 
at all during critical post-conviction review of their convictions and sen-
tences.29  This is the part of the process during which many people have 
proven their innocence, established violations of their constitutional rights, 
or shown that other grievous errors entitled them to new trials.  People who 
can afford a lawyer to represent them in these proceedings may be success-
ful in showing a violation of their constitutional rights and may be able to 
obtain a new trial.  But those who cannot afford a lawyer may not be able 
to seek post-conviction review and, as a result, regardless of innocence or 
constitutional violations at their trial, must serve their sentences or even be 
executed. 
While some states provide lawyers—at least to those sentenced to 
death—for post-conviction review in the state courts, most do not.  People 
sentenced to death in states like Alabama and Georgia may obtain repre-
sentation from public interest organizations or lawyers providing pro bono 
representation.  But there are not enough lawyers for all of them.  And poor 
people who receive sentences other than death—even those sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole—have virtually no hope 
of obtaining legal representation. 
Exzavious Gibson, a man sentenced to death in Georgia whose IQ was 
found on different tests to be between seventy-six and eighty-two, stood, 
totally bewildered, in front of a judge at his first state post-conviction hear-
ing in Georgia without a lawyer.  The case proceeded as follows: 
THE COURT: OK, Mr. Gibson are you ready to proceed? 
MR. GIBSON: I don’t have an attorney. 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
MR. GIBSON: I am not waiving my rights. 
THE COURT: I understand that.  Do you have any evidence to put 
up? 
MR. GIBSON: I don’t know what to plead. 
THE COURT: Huh? 
  
 28. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring). 
 29. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
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MR. GIBSON: I don’t know what to plead.30 
The state of Georgia, which sought to bring about Gibson’s execution, 
was represented by an assistant attorney general who specialized in capital 
post-conviction cases.  After the assistant attorney general presented testi-
mony, the judge turned again to Mr. Gibson: 
THE COURT: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask [the witness] any 
questions? 
MR. GIBSON: I don’t have counsel.  
THE COURT: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me 
yes or no whether you want to ask him any questions or not? 
MR. GIBSON: I’m not my own counsel. 
THE COURT: I’m sorry, sir, I didn’t understand you.  
MR. GIBSON: I’m not my own counsel. 
THE COURT: I understand, but do you want . . . to ask him any-
thing?  
MR. GIBSON: I don’t know. 
THE COURT: Okay, sir.  Okay, thank you.  [To the witness], you 
can go down.31  
This was a hearing which determined whether Exzavious Gibson 
would be put to death.  Gibson was unable to call witnesses, make objec-
tions, or cross-examine the state’s witnesses.  The judge denied relief by 
signing a twenty-two-page order prepared by the assistant attorney general 
without changing even a comma.  The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the 
proceedings, holding that Gibson had no right to counsel.32 
Other states may provide the condemned with lawyers to represent 
them in post-conviction review even though they are not required to do so.  
But the lawyers provided may be as bad or worse than those assigned to 
defend the accused at trial.  A lawyer assigned to represent an inmate sen-
tenced to death in Texas filed the identical brief for him that he had filed 
for another inmate in another case with different facts and different is-
  
 30. Transcript of Hearing of Sept. 12, at 2–3, Gibson v. Turpin, No. 95-V-648 (Butts County, Ga. 
Super. Ct. 1995). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 187 (Ga. 1999); see also Murray, 492 U.S. at 10; Barbour v. 
Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1228–32 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding no right to counsel in post-conviction re-
view).  But see Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (holding that the state is required to 
appoint counsel for condemned persons in post-conviction proceedings). 
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sues.33  The brief filed on behalf of another man condemned to die in 
Texas, Justin Fuller, was incoherent, repetitious, and rambling, making 
arguments that did not make any sense.34  The lawyer copied some of his 
client’s letters into the brief.  As a result, the brief contained unintelligible 
and irrelevant statements such as, “I’m just about out of carbon paper so 
before I run out I want to try and list everything that was added to and took 
from me to convict me on the next page.”35  Nevertheless, Fuller’s appeal 
was denied and he was executed.   
There is no justification for a court accepting such briefs in any case.  
Without adequate briefing, a court cannot do its job.  A court concerned 
about justice would have removed the lawyers from these cases and ap-
pointed competent lawyers so that it could decide the case based upon 
briefs on the issues in the cases.  But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
did not slow down in these or other cases in order to get decent briefing 
before denying relief and allowing executions.36  
Even condemned inmates who are fortunate to receive competent rep-
resentation in seeking habeas corpus review face in the federal courts what 
Justice Harry Blackmun described as a “Byzantine morass of arbitrary, 
unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal 
rights.”37  The Writ of Habeas Corpus has been described “[o]ver the cen-
turies” as “the common law world’s ‘freedom writ’ by whose orderly proc-
esses the production of a prisoner in court may be required and the legality 
of the grounds for his incarceration inquired into, failing which the pris-
oner is set free.”38  The Supreme Court once said, “‘there is no higher duty 
than to maintain it unimpaired, and unsuspended, save only in the cases 
specified in our Constitution.’”39   
However, since its decision in Wainwright v. Sykes40 in 1977, the Su-
preme Court has been on a “crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in 
the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional 
  
 33. See Chuck Lindell, Lawyer Makes 1 Case for 2 Killers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 26, 
2006, at A1. 
 34. See Maro Robbins, Convict’s Odds Today May Rest on Gibberish, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Aug. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Ex parte Rojas, No. 39062-01, 2003 WL 1825617, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 
2003) (Price, J., dissenting) (no post-conviction review because lawyer assigned to case missed statute 
of limitations); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding no right to competent 
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings where lawyer appointed by the court lacked experience 
and failed to raise certain claims); see also TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE (2002) 
(describing inadequacy of lawyers assigned to provide post-conviction representation in Texas), avail-
able at http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.asp. 
 37. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758–59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 38. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712–13 (1961). 
 39. Id. at 713 (quoting Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)). 
 40. 433 U.S. 72, 88–91 (1977). 
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claims.”41  Justice John Paul Stevens said in one case that “the Court has 
lost its way in a procedural maze of its own creation” and “grossly mis-
evaluated the requirements of ‘law and justice.’”42  Congress restricted 
habeas corpus review even further by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, which placed new, unprecedented restric-
tions on habeas corpus review,43 including a statute of limitations for filing 
petitions.44 
What does it say about our commitment to equal justice and the rule of 
law when courts and legislatures tolerate such poor representation or even 
no representation at all in cases where life and liberty are at stake?  Richard 
Posner, a respected judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, wrote:  
I can confirm from my own experience as a judge that indigent de-
fendants are generally rather poorly represented.  But if we are to 
be hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be entirely a 
bad thing.  The lawyers who represent indigent criminal defen-
dants seem to be good enough to reduce the probability of convict-
ing an innocent person to a very low level.  If they were much bet-
ter, either many guilty people would be acquitted or society would 
have to devote much greater resources to the prosecution of crimi-
nal cases.  A bare-bones system for the defense of indigent crimi-
nal defendants may be optimal.45 
Judge Posner writes that if public defenders were much better, some guilty 
people might be acquitted; but he does not mention what is the most im-
portant result of better public defenders: some innocent people, who are 
now being convicted, would also be acquitted.  That is what we should be 
concerned about, but it did not occur to him.   
The “bare-bones system” he finds so attractive is only for poor people 
in criminal cases.  He does not suggest a “bare-bones system” for cases 
involving wealthy people, for commercial cases, or any other kinds of 
cases.  That says a lot about what kind of society we have: one kind of 
  
 41. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 
401, 406–11 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533–36 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
130–34 (1982); see also Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant? The Evisceration of Federal Ha-
beas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 42. Smith, 477 U.S. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 43. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1221–26. 
 44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2255 (2006) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations).  A statute of 
limitations of 180 days is provided in § 2263 for states that meet certain standards of providing counsel 
in capital post-conviction proceedings. 
 45. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 163–64 (1999). 
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justice for people who can afford it and another kind of justice system—a 
“bare-bones system”—for people who cannot afford it.  Whether we have 
these two very different systems of justice is not about being tough on 
crime or soft on crime, or for the death penalty or against it.  It’s about 
whether we have equal justice; it’s about whether we have a fair and reli-
able system for deciding guilt and innocence, liberty and custody, life and 
death.  
Those willing to settle for a “bare-bones system” or a second class sys-
tem of justice for those accused of crimes suffer from, at best, a poverty of 
vision with regard to what kind of justice system we should have and, at 
worst, indifference to injustices that result from barely providing lawyers 
to people at trial and not guaranteeing lawyers at all in post-conviction 
review. 
During the years of efforts to establish a public defender system in 
Georgia, one thing that we heard at meetings and legislative hearings was: 
“We don’t need a Cadillac, we’ll be happy with a Chevy.”  When I was in 
Louisiana recently at a meeting regarding the sad condition of representa-
tion for poor people accused of crimes in that state, once again I heard 
people saying that Louisiana did not need a Cadillac, just a Chevy. 
I do not understand why we do not want a Cadillac.  This is a system 
responsible for providing representation to people facing loss of their lib-
erty or lives.  Why shouldn’t we have the very best system our society can 
provide?  But we have set our sights on the embarrassing target of medioc-
rity.  Our commitment as a society is to something that is quite a bit less 
than a full measure of justice for those accused of crimes.   
The courts are failing to provide equal justice in another way as well.  
Their decisions continue to be influenced by race.  This is the twentieth 
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,46 in 
which the Court upheld Georgia’s capital punishment system despite pro-
nounced racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty in that 
state.  The Court suggested that racial disparities may be inevitable and 
held that they do not violate either the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the procedural protections of the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
As a result of McCleskey and other failures to deal with the influence 
of race, the criminal justice system is the part of our society which has 
been least affected by the civil rights movement.  There have been many 
changes as a result of the civil rights movement.  There are now people of 
color on city councils, county commissions, in state legislatures, and in 
Congress.  John Lewis, who was among the civil rights marchers severely 
  
 46. 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). 
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beaten by Alabama troopers when they tried to cross the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge in an attempt to march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965, is now 
a member of the U.S. Congress. 
But at many courthouses throughout the South, very little has changed.  
In many courtrooms, things look no different than they did in the 1950s 
and before.  The prosecutor is white, the judge is white, the defense law-
yers are white, and the clerks and court reporters are white.  Even in com-
munities with very substantial African American populations, the jury may 
be all white because it is still common for black people to be struck from 
juries because of their race.  But when the defendants are brought in—
when a group of African American men all handcuffed together wearing 
orange jumpsuits are brought into the courtroom—it looks like a slave ship 
has docked outside the courthouse.  
Justice William Brennan described the reality of the impact of race in 
our criminal justice system in his dissenting opinion in McCleskey:  
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked 
his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die.  A 
candid reply to this question would have been disturbing.  First, 
counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the 
crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more impor-
tant than the fact that his victim was white.  Furthermore, counsel 
would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with 
killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sen-
tenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks.  In addi-
tion, frankness would compel the disclosure that it was more likely 
than not that the race of McCleskey’s victim would determine 
whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants 
convicted of killing a white person would not have received the 
death penalty if their victims had been black, while, among defen-
dants with aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to 
McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would not have been sentenced to die 
if their victims had been black.  Finally, the assessment would not 
be complete without the information that cases involving black de-
fendants and white victims are more likely to result in a death sen-
tence than cases featuring any other racial combination of defen-
dant and victim.  The story could be told in a variety of ways, but 
McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line: there 
was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in 
determining if he lived or died.47 
  
 47. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Brennan ended his opinion by concluding: 
The Court’s decision today will not change what attorneys in 
Georgia tell other Warren McCleskeys about their chances of exe-
cution.  Nothing will soften the harsh message they must convey, 
nor alter the prospect that race undoubtedly will continue to be a 
topic of discussion.  McCleskey’s evidence will not have obtained 
judicial acceptance, but that will not affect what is said on death 
row.  However many criticisms of today’s decision may be ren-
dered, these painful conversations will serve as the most eloquent 
dissents of all.48 
Twenty years later, we still have those conversations with our clients.  
We still tell them that race may be more important than anything else in 
influencing the outcome of their cases.   
There must be a reckoning at some point.  If the legislatures and the 
courts continue to deny people adequate legal representation, if race con-
tinues to be a powerful influence on decisions from police stops for “driv-
ing while black” to life and death decisions in capital cases, at some point 
we are going to have to sandblast “Equal Justice Under Law” off the Su-
preme Court building.  It is one thing to say we are working towards it, that 
it is an aspiration of our legal system, but if our society gives up on it, if 
we settle for the very unequal treatment of people in our legal system that 
we have now, then that phrase should not be on the Supreme Court build-
ing.  
Our society is moving in the wrong direction in part because instead of 
working to implement a vision of what kind of society we want to have, we 
have been reacting out of fear to threats to our way of life.  We once had a 
President who told us “that the only thing we [had] to fear is fear itself.”49  
President Roosevelt’s message was that if the American people did not 
panic, if they kept their wits about them and tackled the immense problems 
that the country faced in 1933, they would find ways to deal with them and 
be successful in doing so.  But today, we have a President who tells us to 
fear everything: to fear criminals; to fear drugs; to fear same-sex couples; 
and, more than anything else, to fear terrorists. 
Out of our fear, we have been fighting a war on drugs that has cost us 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment and filled prisons at enormous 
costs, but done little or nothing to prevent crime or addiction.  Out of fear, 
we have been fighting a war on crime that—in the popular understanding 
  
 48. Id. at 344–45. 
 49. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS, MARCH 4, 1933, reprinted in 
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 269, 269 (1989). 
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of things—has relegated the provision of the Bill of Rights to nothing more 
than a collection of “technicalities” that get in the way of fighting crime.   
And we are in a war on terrorism that we are told justifies all sorts of 
things that are contrary to our values: holding people without charges, 
without lawyers, and without judicial review; engaging in interrogation 
techniques that amount to torture; intercepting people and sending them to 
countries that do not respect human rights for interrogation; limiting ha-
beas corpus review even more or denying it altogether; and closing the 
courts to the public and the media in some cases for hearings and argu-
ments.50 
Whether the government should have suspended some constitutional 
protections in the Civil War or World War II is very controversial, but at 
least those wars came to an end.  The wars against terrorism, crime, and 
drugs will never end.  There is no likelihood that crime or addiction will be 
eliminated from our society or any other.  Terrorism is not an enemy, but a 
tactic that has been employed throughout history.  One or two people can 
engage in an act of terrorism, as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols de-
monstrated in bombing the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City.   
Fighting all of these wars based upon fear and with the notion that we 
can suspend the rules in any of them fundamentally changes the kind of 
society we have.  It is only a matter of time until the thin line between the 
war on terror and the war on crime is blurred; until the laws adopted to 
fight terrorism are used, for example, against those who are alleged to be 
members of gangs in Oakland or Los Angeles.  Ultimately, there will be 
even fewer constitutional protections for those accused of crimes.  The 
Constitution—and the willingness of judges to enforce it—provides the 
only protections that poor and the powerless people accused of crimes have 
from the passions and prejudices of the moment.  They have no political 
action committees; they have not contributed thousands of dollars to obtain 
friends in high places.   
Among the many questions before us are whether we will employ tor-
ture as a tactic and death as a punishment; whether every person, regard-
less of race, regardless of wealth or lack of it, and no matter what he or she 
is accused of, is entitled to due process when life and liberty are at stake; 
whether judges will enforce the Constitution; and whether courts will have 
jurisdiction to consider the pleas of those facing a loss of their lives or lib-
erty.  Will we answer these questions out of arrogance, vengeance, and fear 
or out of humility, understanding, and compassion? 
These are questions about what kind of society we will have.  The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, in deciding whether post-apartheid 
  
 50. See generally COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1. 
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South Africa would have the death penalty, concluded that in that society, 
which was in transition from hatred to understanding, from vengeance to 
reconciliation, there is no place for the death penalty.51 
For the time being, America through its elected leaders has demon-
strated both arrogance and incompetence in adopting a very harsh and un-
forgiving approach to these questions.  But we have the ability to change 
that direction.  My hope is that out of humility, respect for the dignity of 
every person, compassion, and courage, we will decide that the United 
States does not torture people, and that, eventually, we will join the rest of 
the world in making permanent, absolute, and unequivocal the injunction 
“thou shall not kill.” 
  
 51. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 130–31 (S. Afr.), reprinted in 16 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 154, 190 (1995) (Langa, J., concurring). 
